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C H A P T E R 3 
Did the Mongols Matter? 
Territory, Power, and the Intelligentsia in China 
from the Northern Song to the Early Ming 
John W. Dardess 
The China of the early Ming, around 1400, was in several major respects a 
different China from that ruled by the Northern Song and the Liao, around 
1000, or the Southern Song and the Jin, around 1200. Eighty-nine years of 
the Mongol Yuan dynasty separate the end of the Southern Song in 1279 
from the Ming reunification in 1368; whatever the Ming inherited from ear-
lier tradition, it necessarily inherited it through the Yuan filter. What paths 
did China travel to get from there to here? How exactly was the China of 
1400 different from the China of 1000? And what role did the Mongol Yuan 
dynasty play in shaping those differences? Three themes stand out—two of 
them in particularly striking relief. 
The first theme has to do with historical geography. What is now con-
sidered China proper (China minus Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, 
Tibet, and Taiwan) was neither rounded out nor consolidated in xooo or 
even 1200. It was the Yuan dynasty that by 1300 brought about the territorial 
unification of China proper north and south and sponsored further Chinese 
immigration into peripheral regions such as Yunnan and Gansu that had 
earlier been under non-Chinese rule. By 1400, the Chinese Ming captured 
this enlarged national landscape, which has since been passed down through 
the Qing to modern times. 
The second theme is less straightforward. It centers on the question of 
whether territorial enlargement over the years 1000-1400 enhanced or di-
minished the power of the central dynastic state. There are three dimensions 
to this question. One is agenda: did the central government take on more or 
fewer tasks over this period? The second is centralization versus decentrali-
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zation: co what extent did the central government concede or farm out to 
lower levels important parts of its agenda? The third is imperial authority: 
did the early Ming emperors play a more commanding role over government 
than their Song or Yuan predecessors? Although the role of the central gov-
ernment was often the focus of intense factional fighting and therefore often 
volatile, we can discern tendencies toward the enhancement of imperial 
authority, a streamlining of the machinery of central government, and some 
reduction in the size and complexity of its agenda. 
The third theme relates to the rise of a national Confucian intelligentsia. 
As the national territory expanded, and as its rulers struggled over issues re-
lated to its governance, it is clear that a Confucian intelligentsia, as yet in-
visible in the year iooo, emerged and performed an increasingly influential 
role in national political life, presaging in many ways the role of intellectuals 
in more recent times in China. 
These three developments, which often proceeded along separate tracks, 
converged with dramatic effect during the Ming founding in 1368. 
P O L I T I C A L g e o g r a p h y ; 
W H A T W A S " C H I N A " ? 
Beneath the shifting dynastic nomenclature and jurisdictional boundaries of 
the various regimes that ruled in continental East Asia over the period 1000-
1400, there lay in some people's minds, at least in latent form, a geographical 
entity that bore the name "China" (Zhongguo t f S ) ' "Zhongguo" was the 
name used in Song and Ming on those special occasions when it was neces-
sary to distinguish a constant China from the changing sequence of dynas-
ties that occupied all or part of what we now regard as China from all those 
other entities out there that were not-China. 
The historical cartographer Shui Anli f & ^ f l i , active in the late Northern 
Song, understood China as that part of continental East Asia whose territory 
had, from the dawn of history, been marked off into provinces or command-
eries and prefectures (zbou ')'[{, jun etc.), whose people spoke Chinese and 
had heard of the "renowned teachings" (shengjiao Wt^O available in written 
form in that language, and which was ruled, or should be ruled, by a single 
political system constructed in accordance with those teachings. Judging 
by the maps he drew and the captions he wrote, Shui believed that 
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Fig. 3.1 Shui Anli, "Comprehensive Map of the Territories of China 
and Foreign Countries, Ancient and Modern" 
"China" ("Zhongguo," as he calls it) emerged full-blown at an extremely re-
mote time in antiquity, when Emperor Ku a legendary predecessor of 
the sage-rulers Yao and Shun, first laid out its nine classical provinces. His 
maps suggest that the basic geographical extent of China never changed after 
that; that all that happened in later times was refinement and detail—infill-
ing, renaming, reorganizing. Shui embeds China in a somewhat larger Asian 
matrix, which China dominates. Each map, from Emperor Ku's time down 
to the Northern Song, features a long rampart, evidently some sort of great 
wall, extending from southern Manchuria out into Gansu (Fig. 3.1). North 
of the rampart Shui recognizes in his own days a Khitan entity, but not its 
Liao dynasty. Northwest of the rampart, he recognizes a Xi Xia state. Each 
has made what looks like an incursion into China and roped certain Chinese 
prefectures into its own orbit (Fig. 3.2). A separate map labeled "Prefectures 
and Commanderies Beyond the Reach (huawai of the Present Dy-
nasty" draws circles around the sixteen Liao-held prefectures in north China, 
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Fig. 3.2 Shui Anli, "Map of the Nine Regions of the Yuanfeng 
Reign Period of Our Sagely (Song) Dynasty" 
plus thirteen in Gansu and Ningxia, ten along the western frontier of Si-
chuan, and thirteen more in the southwest. These Shui describes as "in the 
same category as places held at loose rein under the Tang, which do not 
submit their taxes or registers to the Ministry of Revenue but are places to 
which [China's] renowned teachings (shengjiao) have spread." A curious 
feature of Shui's maps is their lack of definition to the west and southwest. 
Aside from the sharp line of the northern rampart, where China abruptly 
stops, or that of the east coast, beyond which China clearly does not extend, 
it is never certain just how far China goes in any other direction. Interesting, 
too, is Shui's use of the term shengjiao: it definitely points to the existence out 
there, beyond Northern Song control, of sinophone populations who 
through schooling and education maintained "orthodox" lifestyles, learned 
traditions, and latently "Chinese" political allegiances. 
Some two and a half centuries later, during the Yuan-Ming interregnum, 
Song Lian (1310-81)—who may or may not have seen Shui Anli's 
maps—touched on some of the same points from an idealized, though less 
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schematic, more historically grounded point of view. He wrote that when 
the Zhou dynasty was at its height, China (Zhongguo) had been very small 
and consisted of no more than several tens of present-day prefectures, an is-
land embedded in a vast non-Chinese sea. Since by contrast the Han dy-
nasty was gigantic (9,302 li east to west, and 13,368 li north to south, he 
noted), Song wondered rhetorically whether that meant that Han power 
was superior to Zhou virtue. "Does this mean that intelligence and force are 
superior to benevolence and righteousness?" he asked. Of course not: "The 
Zhou dynasty looked upon the realm as a public affair. It followed only 
where shengjiao led, and it had no desire to compel others through force. The 
Han dynasty looked upon the realm as a private affair; it interested itself in 
what power could compel through annexation. Indeed it could annex, but 
look at the short life of the Han as compared to the Zhou! The question is a 
bad one."2 For "Han" here, it seems safe also to read "Yuan." 
How members of the intelligentsia like Shui Anli and Song Lian con-
ceived of "China" in terms of people and territory surely affected national 
policy, even if it did not wholly determine it. But precisely how were the 
Chinese defined as a people? Perhaps the broadest definition was cultural: 
the outward observance of lifestyle implied by the term shengjiao. William 
H. McNeill has observed that "persons of diverse background [could] be-
come fully and completely Chinese simply by becoming learned" (McNeill 
1985:19). There was also a narrower definition: Chinese were those who pos-
sessed Chinese surnames and who shared in a national descent-group patri-
mony stemming from the mythical Yellow Emperor. As Patricia Ebrey 
notes, "Those who took themselves as Chinese by descent were neither con-
fident that Chinese culture could or would transform aliens nor comfortable 
with seeing assimilated descendants of aliens appear to be denying or hiding 
their actual ancestry" (Ebrey 1996: 2,5). 
Song Lian's student Fang Xiaoru Jj^JfH (1357-1402) was troubled by 
the survival of Mongol cultural contamination into the early Ming and, in a 
famous essay he wrote around 1380, bridged the contradiction between cul-
ture and race by raising the bar of assimilation. Fang insisted that "becoming 
fully and completely Chinese" required that families wholly accept the strin-
gent disciplines of the socio-ethical order of China, a process that could be 
expected to take many generations: 
What is precious in China is its system of human relations. [China] can partake of 
the Way of the former kings, thanks to the beauty of its ritual and culture (liwen 
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f a a n d the social discriminations it observes through its system of robes and 
caps.. . . Among barbarians, however, nephews cohabit with aunts, and sons fight 
with fathers, because they do not observe the hierarchical distinctions implicit in 
human relations, and because they lack the finer things like robes and caps and rit-
ual and culture.... 
Some argue that because in the Spring and Autumn era, all the territory in what 
is now south China was barbarian, no one from the south is fit to rule China. I re-
ject that argument, because in the 2,000 years since the Qin dynasty southerners 
have made the rites and righteousness their heritage, and therefore they have become 
part of China. Their human relations have been clarified, and their customs have been 
made splendid. People from south China are now in no way comparable to barbari-
ans.3 (Italics added) 
T h e difficulty for some of the Chinese intelligentsia as guardians of the 
Chinese socio-moral order in the Yuan period, when many foreigners were 
domiciled in China, was the susceptibility of the Chinese shi class to 
contamination by foreign lifestyles. Kong Qi ^LW (ca. 1315-after 1368), for 
example, viewed Uighurs (and other foreigners common in China in his day) 
acceptable as a people but not as a culture, because they did not practice sex 
segregation. H e urged that the Chinese avoid social intercourse with 
Uighurs, especially because of the fatal attraction their lax customs had for 
females and other weak-willed elements in the Chinese upper classes.4 Wang 
Wei (132.3-74) recalled that Yuan rule south of the Yangzi River had 
brought about a most unwelcome cultural revolution among the Chinese 
upper class: 
After the Yuan conquest of Jiangnan, the customs of ritual and culture (liwen fjjf >C) 
changed under the influence of the overbearing crudity of the conquerors, such that 
after a few decades everyone became so acclimated to it that it became custom, and 
the old ways of the Song completely disappeared. The shi plaited their hair and wore 
short coats; they mimicked the Mongol language and dress in order to ingratiate 
themselves with their rulers, in the hope that they might thereby advance them-
selves. Those who steadfastly clung to Chinese tradition were ridiculed for being 
backward and shy.5 
If the Chinese "nation" was defined by conformity to demanding socio-
moral norms, then the political and military expansion of its territory would 
find itself not stopped, perhaps, but certainly inhibited by ideology. The 
Confucian W a y was not exactly a proselytizing religion. Indeed, far from 
feeling confident about their own faithfulness to it, the Chinese intelligentsia 
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seem to have been prey either to real fear or to paranoia that the Chinese 
people were far more susceptible to barbarization than the barbarians were 
to the adoption of Chinese socio-moral norms.6 
The irony is that the Yuan conquest of much of East Asia in fact opened 
new space for the expansion of Chinese society. To judge from modern his-
torical maps, such as those prepared by Chen Cheng-siang (1980: 204, 218), 
the territory controlled by the Ming in 1522 was larger by some 30 percent 
than that controlled by the Northern Song in 1102. The chief gains were 
southern Manchuria and the Liaodong peninsula, a northern strip of terri-
tory along the 41st parallel, the Gansu-Ningxia region, and the southwestern 
provinces of Guizhou and Yunnan. 
Of course, this expansion owed a great deal to the legacy of the military 
conquests undertaken under Mongol auspices in the thirteenth century, of 
which "Zhongguo" was the principal beneficiary in the long run. The Mon-
gols did "China" a favor by obliterating several non-Chinese regimes long 
in occupation of arguably Chinese territories: the Tangut X i Xia (1227), 
the Jurchen Jin (1234), and the Tibeto-Burman kingdom of Dali in Yun-
nan (1254). It was these regions near or contiguous to the Northern Song 
domain that the Ming effectively repossessed after Yuan rule collapsed in 
the 1360s. 
This raises the issue of dynastic rule over all or part of Chinese territory. 
The period 1000-1400 featured dynastic regimes of two main types: the 
culturally homogeneous and the culturally complex, or polyethnic, Basic to 
the structure of polyethnic regimes was military-political rule by an Inner 
Asian ethnic minority over a Chinese majority (or near-majority) with the 
ruling minority deploying political symbols and techniques adapted from the 
Chinese learned tradition. As rulers, the Khitans, Jurchens, and Mongols 
accommodated Chinese culture. Although they imposed certain discrimina-
tions on Chinese, they also accorded Chinese culture so many official ges-
tures of respect as to place their own ethnic and cultural survival in China at 
risk in the longer term. The culturally homogeneous regimes were the two 
Song dynasties and the Ming, in which the ruling house and the higher po-
litical and military echelons shared the same Chinese ethnicity as the major-
ity of the population, and no privileges or concessions were given to non-
Chinese languages and cultures (although the Ming officially recognized 
northern Chinese as a disadvantaged regional ethnicity in need of certain 
special privileges). 
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One important difference between the two types of regimes was the un-
willingness of the culturally homogeneous Chinese regime to assign a place 
of honor to, or in any way glorify, its permanent military establishment. In 
part, this downgrading of the military class resulted from unhappy experi-
ences with repeated military coups during the Five Dynasties era and the ef-
fective institutional engineering carried out by the Northern Song founders 
to ensure against the recurrence of such coups. The Confucian revival that 
began in the eleventh century certainly reinforced this state of affairs by 
sedulously fostering a permanent suspicion of the professional military and 
by arrogating to civil authority and to the Confucian community at large the 
privileges of formulating strategy, managing military operations, and orga-
nizing local militias. 
What this led to during the three centuries of the Song was the inability, 
despite occasional aggressive probes, to fulfill the ultimate dynastic goal of 
recovering those territories under Tangut, Khitan, or Jurchen rule that 
contained substantial Chinese populations. Song governments regularly 
postponed the ultimate goal of reunification in favor of one or another 
proximate or preparatory goal, such as state-directed enhancement of na-
tional resources in the Northern Song or moral-spiritual rearmament in the 
Southern Song. 
On the other side of the coin, conquering all of China seems never to 
have been an overriding aim of the Tanguts, Khitans, or Jurchens. The 
Khitans were content with their sixteen Chinese prefectures, and both the 
Khitan and Northern Song courts worked consistently and successfully for 
over a century to keep the peace, treating each other as though they were 
members of a single family (Wright 1996). The Jurchens failed to exploit an 
opportunity to conquer all of China in the twelfth century. James T . C. Liu 
has argued that they failed to do so because (1) it was never their aim to do it 
and (2) they would have had to cooperate effectively with Song defectors, 
which they were disinclined to do (J. Liu 1995)/ In contrast to the vehement 
revanchism expressed on occasion by the Southern Song intelligentsia, the 
Chinese intelligentsia under Jurchen rule appear to have been uninterested 
in any plan to conquer the south; one of their leading lights, Wang Ruoxu 
(1174-1243), argued that "there is no reason why every country 
should be destroyed and unification achieved" (Tao 1988:104). 
The Mongols appear to constitute the exceptional case. Yet Thomas 
Barfield (1991) has argued that at the outset the Mongols would have pre-
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ferred not to conquer China but to exploit it from a distance, just as all 
Mongolia-based regimes had done before them; they were, however, frus-
trated by the unwillingness of the Jin and the Xia to make agreements with 
them. Perhaps so; but starting from the time of Chinghis Khan himself, the 
Mongols were also poised, by their culture and by recent experience, to 
commandeer non-Mongol military forces and technical expertise and to pa-
tronize religious and intellectual elites from all parts of the world. Their em-
pire was multicultural, not bi-cultural in the manner of the Khitans and Jur-
chens. Khubilai was not caught in the Jin emperors' dilemma of having to 
steer between the Jurchen world on the one side and the Chinese on the 
other, because Khubilai had not two but a good half-dozen major ethnicities 
(which gradually were reduced to four) at his disposal. He was willing to 
meet the Chinese part way and "sinify" himself and his regime to whatever 
extent appeared advantageous. Of course, he desired access to South China's 
resources, but for some years he seems to have been willing to "coexist" with 
the Southern Song and tap its wealth by way of tribute. The refusal of the 
Song to agree to such an arrangement for very long prompted Khubilai's 
Chinese advisors (who under Jurchen rule had been unaggressive) to urge its 
outright annexation (Schlegel 1968). 
In order to annex Southern Song territory, Khubilai had to commandeer 
Chinese infantry and naval forces and leadership on a large scale and to agree 
to let his northern Chinese officials portray him in their overtures to their 
southern compatriots as a Confucian-style monarch who understood the 
symbolisms of Confucian governance and would respect Confucian valuesr 
By the time Hangzhou fell in 1276, the Mongol rulers already had had about 
a half-century of intermittent experience in taking Khitan and Chinese ad-
vice, reconstructing Chinese-style political and military institutions, and pa-
tronizing Confucianism (starting with the founding of the national college 
and its attached Confucian temple in 1233, and the institution of civil service 
examinations in 1237). By their careful words and actions in South China, 
the Mongols made an acceptable case for their competence and legitimacy as 
rulers there. 
After Khubilai, it remained for the Yuan to secede from the larger Mon-
gol world-empire, to cease using China as a resource base for further con-
quests, to exclude all but those Mongols and other foreigners domiciled in 
China from the competition for power and privilege, and to begin to behave 
like a "normal" dynasty whose concerns were focused wholly on China and 
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its particular problems and issues. By the early decades of the fourteenth 
century, this shift was almost complete, and it was no longer necessary for 
Chinese advocates to wage the often desperate fight they had waged until as 
late as Khubilai's reign to preserve Hanfa MH (Chinese as opposed to Is-
lamic or other foreign administrative traditions). Mongol rule became more 
and more a cover beneath which an increasingly assertive Chinese intelli-
gentsia resumed the struggles and debates that had been put on hold since 
the fall of the Southern Song a half-century earlier. 
Unexpectedly, Yuan rule in China collapsed within a few decades of its 
evolution toward dynastic normalcy. Just when the Yuan was readier than 
ever to pay close and sensitive attention to China's needs, it began to unravel. 
Eventually it came undone in the course of dealing with the aftereffects of 
the great insurrections of the 1350s. 
The most important Yuan legacy in a positive sense was its unification of 
"Zhongguo" under one sovereign political system. The founders of the Ming 
never thought to return to Song conditions and satisfy themselves with a 
"lesser empire." They first created a base area south of the Yangzi and then 
accomplished what had never been done before: the conquest of the whole of 
China starting from the south and marching north. The stiff resistance of 
the Khitans and Jurchens against the northward probes of the Song was 
scarcely in evidence, so complete was the collapse of the Yuan. The Ming 
forces undertook further conquests, ostensibly to remove threats from pro-
Yuan elements along the outer edges of the Yuan realm: northern Tibet 
(Lintao ^ ^ and Hezhou 1370, 1377), Yunnan (1382), and central 
Manchuria (1387). The Ming founder's armies invaded Mongolia in 1372 and 
1388 not to annex it but pre-emptively to destroy what remained of the Yuan 
court and whatever illusions it may have had about reclaiming its lost pos-
sessions in China. 
In his Ancestral Instructions of 1373, the founder of the Ming, Zhu Yuan-
zhang (the Hongwu emperor, r. 1368-98), deemed Korea, Ja-
pan, Annam, and various countries in Southeast Asia forever off-limits as 
targets for military attack by the dynasty. No other territories were ex-
empted from Ming conquest (Farmer 1995: 119-21). It seems Ming China 
was free to colonize and incorporate territory along other frontiers, if condi-
tions were favorable. Indeed the Ming resumed a piecemeal frontier expan-
sion project that the Song had conducted, and the Yuan had enlarged.8 But 
unlike the Mongols, the Chinese state (Song or Ming) was uninterested in 
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the conquest of frontier territory unless it already had a Chinese population 
or appeared capable of sustaining one. Yet Mongol rule assisted and pa-
tronized Chinese frontier expansion: Zhang Wenqian >t (1217-83), a 
Chinese official whom the Mongols posted to former Xi Xia territory in 
1264, brought in educated refugees from Sichuan to help set up schools to 
teach Chinese language and customs to children there (de Rachewiltz et al. 
1993: 275). According to Ruth Dunnell (1991: 158), perhaps half of the three 
million people in Xi Xia territory were ethnic Chinese, and it is conceivable 
that it was mainly Chinese rather than Tangut or Tibetan children who en-
rolled in the schools. A Muslim official by the name of Saiyid Ajall directed 
a multicultural development project in the former kingdom of Dali in Yun-
nan after 1273, in which Chinese immigration was encouraged, Confucian 
schools and temples were built, and Chinese marriage and funeral rites pro-
moted (de Rachewiltz et al. 1993: 466-79).9 
As Wang Gungwu (1983) has pointed out, there were several very differ-
ent traditional modes of discourse that officials or writers in China might 
use in addressing frontier issues. These included the language of cosmic 
equality (isbi tongren —^JUrHH), the language of tributary discrimination and 
hierarchy (inner versus outer, Chinese versus barbarian), and the language of 
racism (barbarians as sub-human animals). Early Ming rhetoric about fron-
tier affairs tended toward the euphoric, radiating optimism about the at-
tractiveness of the Way of the Sages and Worthies to non-Chinese ethnici-
ties in places like Hainan island, Yunnan, or the Western Ocean. Xie Jin 
(1369-1415) wrote of the minorities of Guangxi (Yao, Zhuang, Miao, 
Lao) that their rebellious and treacherous nature was due mainly to their 
hard and poor lives in a rugged and malarial region: "But if the Chinese peo-
ple (Zbongguoren ^ U S A ) teach them literacy, then before long they will be-
come wholly reverent and obedient, and who will then say that their natures 
are not good?"10 
Reality soon set in, however. Along the frontiers, whose Chinese popula-
tions in the early Ming were mainly military, there was fear that recogniza-
bly Chinese customs were in imminent danger of barbarization and that 
providing for the cultural needs of the Chinese population had priority over 
the efforts required to transform barbarians. Zhu Yuanzhang expressed this 
view in 1384 as the rationale for his decision to set up state-sponsored Con-
fucian schools in the Liaodong peninsula. "If the children of the military live 
long on the frontier without hearing the teaching of decorum," he insisted, 
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"then their natures will suffer change. It will advance their characters to learn 
the Classics and practice the rituals, and one day they may even become em-
ployable [as civil officials]."11 
What tended to happen over the long run along the western and south-
western frontiers, where "China" thinned out and non-China assumed a 
heavier presence, was not assimilation in either direction but a standoff in 
the form of institutional-cultural dualisms, with Chinese-style governance 
through prefectures and counties next to the colonial control of non-
Chinese peoples through the so-called tusi i W ] system.12 To this day, cities 
in those frontier regions, like Hohhot, Xining, Lanzhou, and Kunming, 
retain traces of that older dualism of walled Chinese centers and outlying 
native settlements (Gaubatz 1996). 
In sum, to return to the questions of how to define a national territory for 
China and what happened to it over the years 1000-1400, a historical break-
point did apparently take place in the Yuan. The Mongols did away with 
most of the multistate "system" that had prevailed for centuries in continental 
East Asia and replaced it with a unified sovereignty and system of govern-
ment, one that accorded official patronage and privilege at the central level to 
several Chinese and non-Chinese ethnic categories. The Ming assumed con-
trol of the empire that the Yuan had created. But as a Chinese regime that 
championed shengjiao exclusively, the Ming "recognized" other ethnicities only 
at the low systemic level of local chiefdoms along its distant frontiers. 
A G E N D A , C E N T R A L I Z A T I O N , 
A N D A U T O C R A C Y 
What did the Liao, Northern Song, Jin, Southern Song, Yuan, and early 
Ming central governments try to accomplish? Which were less ambitious, 
and which tried to use state power to change the world? Contrary to expec-
tation, perhaps, the territorially larger regimes showed the more activism, if 
only in spurts. 
G. William Skinner (1977: 25-26) has argued that China's national 
agenda underwent a long-term process of shrinkage and reduction after the 
eighth century, and R. Bin Wong (1994: 55) has noted among scholars "an 
emerging consensus about the Chinese state becoming less activist in the late 
imperial period." The Liao dynasty surely exemplifies that trend, but major 
exceptions must be noted. Contemporary with the Liao was the Northern 
Did the Mongols Matter? 1 13 
Song. There, in the eleventh century, Wang Anshi z E ^ S ( 102 1 -86) strove 
to make an activist central government the driving engine for the expansion 
of the national wealth and the enhancement of its military power. Although 
he enjoyed some success, his effort did not survive vehement and sustained 
protest from within the ranks of government and what Robert Hymes (1986: 
217) has noted as the profound effects of the Jurchen conquest of North 
China in the 1120s, which effectively discredited it. Except perhaps for its en-
ergetic development of state Confucian schools (Tao 1995), the Jurchen Jin 
in no way considered itself an heir to Northern Song bureaucratic activism. 
As for the Southern Song state, it left much of education, food supply, and 
rural organization—large parts of which had been part of the central agenda 
of the Northern Song—to the extra-governmental initiative of an emergent 
Confucian community and landlord-gentry class. 
The Yuan's agenda appears complex and crowded in comparison to those 
of its predecessors. There were also moments of high ambition, particularly 
in the 1340S-1350S, when Chancellor Toghto ( 13 14-56) , responding to natu-
ral disasters and popular riots, rerouted the Yellow River, organized nation-
wide anti-rebel forces, and even tried to turn North China into a major rice-
growing region (Dardess 1994: 5 7 2 - 7 8 ) . 
The agenda of the early Ming central government was extremely ambi-
tious, yet very different in profile from either that of the Northern Song or 
the Yuan. The Ming controlled a China blasted and battered by seventeen 
years of civil war. Its goals were truly revolutionary. Unlike the Song or 
Yuan states, however, the early Ming central government had good access to 
taxable sources of wealth, was fiscally satisfied, and undemanding of more. 
Also in contrast to the situation in the Song or Yuan, the Ming center was 
resolved—albeit at the smallest possible fiscal cost, through propaganda and 
coercion, and through centrally directed local organization (what Farmer 
[1987: 2 1 - 2 2 ] calls the Ming founder's "social blueprints")—to accomplish 
nothing less than the ethical and behavioral transformation of the entire 
population of China in accordance with ancient norms laid out in the Con-
fucian canon. (That project was soft-pedaled, and then in effect abandoned, 
after Zhu Yuanzhang's death in 1398.) 
Given the shifting agendas of China's various dynasties over the years 
1 0 0 0 - 1 4 0 0 , there seems to be no useful way in which their governmental 
systems can be described as either wholly centralized or wholly decentral-
ized. Much depended on the nature of the tasks at hand. Large-scale military 
112 J O H N W. D A R D E S S 
efforts often called for decentralization, as with the Southern Song (Hart-
well 1988: 78), the Jurchen Jin (Bol 1987: 523), and the Mongols (both early 
on, during their conquest of Jurchen-held north China, when they co-opted 
local hereditary warlords, and later, when they again sought to co-opt war-
lords).14 But there was nothing inevitable about this. The center might con-
trol large military operations, as was the case with Toghto in 1351-55 and 
Zhu Yuanzhang from the 1360s . 
Depending on what the center wanted to accomplish, it sometimes made 
sense to centralize some activities and decentralize others. Wang Anshi, for 
example, centralized rural lending at the same time that he decentralized the 
Sichuan tea-horse trading enterprise (Smith 1993: 77). A principal aim of the 
Southern Song court was to redevelop military power on a regional basis, 
which necessitated decentralization, and yet retain ultimate direction and 
control, which demanded just the opposite. The unforgettable example of 
the loyalist hero Yue Fei -fgfPI ( 1 1 0 4 - 4 2 ) stands as testimony to the acute 
difficulty of striking a workable balance between central control and local 
autonomy in the recruitment and deployment of new military forces. Cen-
tralization is easier if existing resources are being concentrated, whereas de-
centralization is often the best choice when new resources must be created 
(Kochen and Deutsch 1 9 8 0 : 1 8 5 - 2 0 6 ) . Yet it must always be asked whether, 
when the center decentralizes one or more important functions, it thereby 
forfeits ultimate oversight and control over those functions. On balance, it 
looks as though all the dynasties under review sustained ultimate central 
control through most of their lifespans by one means or another. When it is 
a question of allocating authority to lower levels, it is not certain to what de-
gree the words "centralized" or "decentralized" fit as blanket labels for any of 
the dynasties ruling in China from 1000 to 1400. 
Several leading scholars, however, label the Yuan as inherently decen-
tralized as a system. I think that the messiness of the Yuan establishment in 
China—its conciliar practices, its proliferation of agencies, its polyethnicity, 
and its paperwork in several scripts and languages—has fed this misconcep-
tion. From early on, Mongol/Yuan central authority in fact sustained its vi-
tality and its ultimate powers precisely through the creative manipulation of 
chaos. The building of Dadu the capital city, in 1 2 6 2 - 8 3 provides a 
good example of the phenomenon. This gigantic task was accomplished not 
through the creation of one huge and unified urban construction firm, but 
by the centrally directed, ad hoc agglomeration of hundreds of discrete 
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groups of planners, supervisors, skilled artisans, and laborers, who were im-
ported by central authorities as needed for the job and then dispersed among 
the many different agencies and jurisdictions from which they had origi-
nated.15 The conquest of Southern Song, which took the Mongols some 45 
years, was finally achieved through the effective patching together of Mongol 
and Chinese commanders; Chinese infantry, engineers, artillery, and ma-
rines; and Confucian advisors and propagandists (Xiao 1994: 385-404). A 
late example, reflecting exactly the methods used to build Dadu and conquer 
the Southern Song, was Toghto's central control of new forces enlisted to 
suppress the mass insurrections of the 1350s. Local Chinese militias and large 
special units were recruited. Mongol and semu (other non-Chinese 
ethnics) commanders were drawn from central, appanage, provincial, and 
censorial agencies, as well as the standing army itself. Jurisdictions deliber-
ately conflicted and overlapped. Armies were aggregated to destroy specific 
targets, then dispersed. Supply, always kept separate from command, was 
divided among different agencies. Everything was done to ensure that no 
autonomous regional machines emerged. And somehow it all worked—in 
the short run. After the emperor dismissed Toghto as chancellor early in 
1355; the Yuan collapsed catastrophically. High-level factionalism, fiscal ex-
haustion, and national calamities of sufficient scale to overwhelm any gov-
ernment were to blame (Dardess 1973: 105-18; 1994). What then developed 
was not decentralization but fragmentation, in which self-appointed leaders 
of this or that region of China reserved to themselves the choice of agreeing 
to a posture of voluntary or symbolic allegiance to the Yuan center or of 
turning against it. 
But was Yuan provincial organization itself an ultimate cause of the 
fragmentation of the Yuan realm after 1355? Was the Yuan so decentralized 
along provincial lines that its early breakup was likely? The editors' intro-
duction to volume 6 of the Cambridge History of China argues strongly for this 
thesis. The Yuan provinces, they write, 
had a quite different character from the [Song] provinces and were more like gov-
ernments of external territories or separate vassal states surrounding the metropoli-
tan domain. . . . Viewed from this angle, Yuan China appears almost as a conglom-
eration of regions under strong regional governments. This relative lack of powerful 
central control certainly contributed to the gradual disintegration of the state after 
1340 when local rebellions and secessionist warlords threatened the empire's unity. 
(Franke and Twitchett 1994: 26) 
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But this argument infers too much from organizational charts.16 Unless it 
can also be shown that the center could not regularly control provincial ap-
pointments or enforce policy, then the thesis fails. In addition, it would need 
to be shown that the Yuan realm after the 1340s fractured along established 
provincial lines. In fact it did not. The provinces as such were too weak to 
play much part in the Yuan breakup. After 1355, the regional warlords owed 
their powers to the armies they had personally recruited. The territories 
they occupied and the administrations they developed had no connection 
with the Yuan provinces. They grew from outside the provincial system. 
N o one seems to question seriously the notion that the Ming dynasty 
from its outset was highly centralized as a governing system. Certainly, com-
pared to the Yuan, it was administratively streamlined. But what are we 
to make of Z h u Yuanzhang's deliberate creation, beginning in 1378, of eigh-
teen hereditary princedoms along the frontiers and in other strategic loca-
tions in China to which he entrusted the defense of his empire (Farmer 1995: 
73-79; Dreyer 1982: 148-51)? These princedoms were destroyed in the civil 
war of 1399-1402, but Zhu's act was unprecedented in recent history. 
Certainly, the Yuan never undertook a comparable move toward military 
decentralization. 
One widely accepted view is that the Song from its founding represented 
an upward leap in the direction of autocracy or at least of a precondition for 
i t—a ruling family sequestered from the rest of Chinese society and elevated 
more securely than ever before above politics. Robert Hartwell (1982: 404-5) 
has drawn attention to a paradox in the post-Song imperial state: the posi-
tion of the emperor over officialdom was enhanced at the same time that the 
ability of the central state to regulate the economic and social life of the 
realm diminished (the shrinking national agenda likewise pointed out by 
Skinner). Is this an accurate characterization of the situation for the period 
under review here? 
It does not appear to characterize the Khitan, Jurchen, and Mongol rul-
ers very well at all, but then the idea was formulated not so much with them 
but, rather, with the Song and Ming cases, in mind. Compared to the courts 
of the Tang, Liao, Jin, or Yuan, the Song throne was remarkably free of vio-
lence and challenge. The internal history of the Song was unblemished by 
palace coups, civil wars, bloody struggles for the throne, or insubordination 
by provincial governors. All but three Song emperors came to power as ma-
ture men, and most of the emperors were conscientious about their duties 
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(Lo 1987: 46, 220-24). The question is whether this meant the Song emper-
ors became autocrats with unrestricted personal power. 
If the Song emperors were despots or autocrats, then it is difficult to un-
derstand why they are so obscure as personalities. Why were all the notable 
Song personalities scholar-officials? And if the Song emperors were truly 
autocrats, then why did they steadily lose independent resources (fiscal, for 
example) they had held at the outset and never acquire new ones (such as 
personal armies)? Moreover, when the Chinese intelligentsia of the Yuan 
considered the Song in retrospect, they never mentioned an increase in 
autocracy. Was it that they failed to see it? If they did see the Song emperors 
as autocrats and simply said nothing about it, then why did they not hold 
the emperors personally accountable for the Song collapse? Why did they 
blame treason and malfeasance in high officialdom instead? Chinese literati 
in the Yuan did consider the Song a weak, "soft" state, a dynasty character-
ized by three centuries of yin emasculation and craven foreign policy, whose 
only memorable legacy lay in its fostering of "loyal officials and righteous 
sons" who ensured by their suicidal martyrdoms that, when it finally col-
lapsed, it did so in unprecedented moral glory.18 
If the Song emperors were autocrats, then they were symbolic autocrats, 
emblems of paternal authority rather than strongmen or warlords, because 
that was what the Song intelligentsia wanted them to be. Major crises, such 
as those of 1126 (the Jurchen invasion of North China) and 1275, found the 
monarchy incapable of exerting leadership, and the scholar-officials as much 
in charge as anyone was (Haeger 1975; Jay 1991). Anthony Sariti (1972) and 
Alan Wood (1995) seem to be on track in arguing that Song Neo-Confucian 
thought, far from licensing any kind of willful despotism, exalted the ruler 
symbolically—as an ideal embodiment of abstract principle and impartial 
moral judgment. The Song rulers were compelled to accept counsel and 
ethical restraint and could not easily have their own way. 
The Khitan, Jurchen, and Mongol emperors lived, behaved, and died in 
circumstances very different from those of their Song counterparts. The 
throne was not above the political process but closely involved in it and was 
often gained and lost in acts of violence. The preferred handbook for foreign 
rulers in China was not the Four Books of Neo-Confiicianism, but the 
Zhenguan zhengyao the practical and pragmatic Tang guide to im-
perial statecraft, which, as Franke points out, is "the only text that has been 
translated into four foreign languages (Khitan, Jurchen, Mongolian, and 
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Tangut)" (Franke 1987: 90). The Yuan was the first dynasty to institute civil 
service examinations based on Song Neo-Confucianism. It was never possi-
ble, however, fully to integrate the Mongol emperors as emblematic fathers 
of a Chinese guojia H l ^ (family-state), and Confucian bureaucrats were 
never more than one source of political support among several for competing 
candidates for the Yuan throne. 
Yet the Yuan monarchy provided an explicitly negative model for the 
founders of the Ming dynasty. The Ming founders chastised the Yuan rulers 
for being creatures of faction and for letting their rightful powers slip into 
the hands of prime ministers. Several important developments converged in 
the early Ming. The early Ming realm governed an expanded national terri-
tory; possessed an ambitious central agenda (the ethical remaking of Chinese 
state and society); achieved a high degree of centralization, in institutions as 
well as in policy and personnel control; and, in order to make it all work, 
gave the emperor a visible and commanding role as policy-forming and deci-
sion-enforcing autocrat. All this was consciously engineered from the outset, 
with major contributions from Confucian intellectuals. Never in the past 
had Confucian intellectuals wielded such influence over a dynasty during its 
formative years. How did that come about? 
G O V E R N M E N T A N D T H E I N T E L L I G E N T S I A 
During the period 1000-1400, Confucian intelligentsias came to play an in-
creasingly vocal role in China's national affairs. Although it cannot be said 
that they created the foundations of centralization and autocracy, they 
certainly accepted them and shaped them to their own purposes. It is worth 
recalling that the Song was founded in the late tenth century by pragmatic 
rulers looking for ways to centralize their authority over a reunified China, 
and in pursuit of that endeavor they recruited as officials learned men from 
both north and south who lacked great wealth or powerful family connec-
tions (Bol 1992: 52-56). Yet it took several generations before a national 
Confucian intelligentsia, consisting of men born in and around the year 
1000, emerged.20 Probably because the Song founders made no pretensions 
to intellectual orthodoxy, their hold on later generations was weak; this 
meant that Song policies and institutions could be modified quite freely as 
the times and perceived national needs changed (Lo 1987:11). Much the same 
holds true for the Jin; two generations elapsed before a "self-sustaining" and 
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"self-conscious" literati culture came into being among the Chinese under Jin 
rule in the 1190s (Bol 1987: 466). 
This was not the case with the Yuan. The Mongols entered a China in 
which both in the north and in the south sizable shi communities had been 
in place for some time. When the Mongols began taking northern Chinese 
into their expanding polyethnic empire in the early decades of the thirteenth 
century, the local warlords and religious and other community leaders who 
defected to them served as mediators for the Jin intellectuals whom they had 
taken under their protection. This process began in the time of Chinghis 
Khan and continued under his successor Ogodei. The influence of the 
North China intelligentsia peaked in the 1250S-60S, early in Khubilai's ca-
reer. Khubilai thought he needed to consolidate all possible sources of po-
litical support in China in connection with his coming bid for power and so 
called them together several times for consultative conferences. Although 
Khubilai shifted his patronage elsewhere once he achieved supreme power in 
1264, northern Chinese intellectuals used the advantages of the moment to 
acquaint the Yuan founder and his family with Chinese statecraft and ethi-
cal traditions and to present him in a flattering light in their writings and 
other discourse as a major actor, not in Mongol or world history but in the 
historical tradition of dynastic China. That Khubilai "belonged" as a great 
founder and unifier in China's dynastic tradition still held in early Ming, 
when the officially sponsored History of the Yuan Dynasty said of him: "Em-
peror Shizu's [Khubilai's] measures were vast. He knew men and was good 
at using them. He placed trust in Confucian techniques (rushu and so 
was able to sinify barbarian ways (i hua hian i j ^ l j l ^ P l ) and set up canons 
and regulations. Because his plans were far-reaching, he succeeded in creat-
ing a system for the entire dynasty."22 
Intellectual life in the Southern Song was more intense than in its Jin 
counterpart. The Southern Song witnessed the stormy rise of the Daoxue 
iH-fl movement, a sectarian "fellowship" that was ar once intellectual (its 
claim to represent absolute moral truth), social (with its local academies, ru-
ral compacts, and community granaries), and political (with its factional 
struggle to secure imperial endorsement). Jin intellectuals became aware of 
Daoxue as early as the 1190s but seem to have been of two minds about it 
(Tillman 1995). Hoyt Tillman (1992: 233-34) has argued that the timing of 
the official recognition accorded to the Daoxue movement by Song Emperor 
Lizong ( r-1225-64) in 1241 was spurred by the challenge to ideological 
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legitimacy posed by (of all people) the Mongols in North China, who in the 
1230s built a Confucian temple, instituted civil service examinations, and 
founded the Taiji Academy dedicated to the propagation of 
Daoxue, in Yanjing 5nt ^ . The gradual elevation' of Daoxue to official or-
thodoxy in the south followed step by step the stages in the Mongol con-
quest of the north and the destruction of the Jin (J. Liu 1988:147-48). It was 
as if the Song seized on Daoxue as some sort of magic elixir, the best hope 
for moral strengthening and dynastic survival. 
Surprisingly, perhaps, Daoxue was not discredited by its last-minute fail-
ure to save the Southern Song. The Yuan rulers patronized it and, indeed, 
helped internationalize it in a simplified form known as Xinxue >C,v!|l (which 
de Bary translates as the "learning of the mind-and-heart"). The Mongol rul-
ers made Xinxue available to Chinese through the state system of education 
and to the many non-Chinese in north China by way of translations of several 
of its key texts. The Confucian X u Heng ffW (1209-81) eagerly taught the 
essential Xinxue doctrines of moral-psychological self-rectification to mem-
bers of the imperial family and to other Mongol and foreign youths in the 
China of his time (de Bary 1981). 
The Yuan conquest of South China in the 1270s brought the southern 
intelligentsia into the Mongol fold as the last and lowest-ranking of the eth-
nic classes the conquerors created to manage the allocation of privilege. Ef-
fectively barred from most top positions, southern intelligentsia entered the 
clerical and teaching services, and a few rose to high advisory positions in 
one or another of the literary academies set up under state auspices in Dadu. 
The censorate also proved hospitable to Chinese officials of southern origin, 
and southerners came to regard it as a crucial institutional niche because of 
the scope it provided for vehement criticism of central policy and personnel. 
The rise of the southern intelligentsia in Yuan service took place at a time 
(1270S-1280S) when the older generation of influential northerners was dying 
off (Sun 1968: 147-48). Southerners scored their first concrete triumphs in 
the early 1300s, with the expansion of the imperial college under the direc-
torship of the southern philosopher W u Cheng (1249-1333); the offi-
cial canonization of the Song Daoxue fathers; and the restitution of the civil 
service examinations, featuring for the first time in history the Daoxue or-
thodoxy in simplified form as subject matter for testing (Sun 1968: 355-60; 
de Bary 1981: 50-60). The examinations had quotas for each of the four rec-
ognized ethnic classes, and thus they served as a mechanism to leverage fur-
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ther intellectual conversions to Confucianism of Mongol and semu youths 
domiciled in China. From that starting point, southern Chinese scholar-
officials serving in Dadu as censors, educators, or academicians gradually 
made themselves more politically influential by exploiting the complex fac-
tional divisions among the Mongol rulers and making good use of the pow-
erful ethical language of the new intellectual orthodoxy, against which the 
proponents of Muslim, Lamaist, or traditionally Mongol forms of discourse 
could not effectively compere. 
Meanwhile, the seedbeds of new developments in Yuan intellectual life 
were found not in Dadu but far away, in several localities in south China, 
where a new generation of intelligentsia emerged. Shock over the Song col-
lapse in 1275 had by this time faded from active memory, and the new genera-
tion began to restudy and rethink the normative foundations of Chinese law 
and statecraft, and to transcend Daoxue by resuming other lines of philo-
sophical inquiry that had long been laid aside. By the 1330s and 1340s, the in-
telligentsia in south China was also conducting an intense re-examination of 
just what it meant to be a shi or a ru ff§, exactly what the larger social purposes 
of the educated Confucian elite were, and how the members of that group 
should go about fulfilling those purposes. Confucian elites in eastern Zhe-
jiang concluded that they must exert personal leadership in planning and exe-
cuting local reform of long-standing fiscal injustices. These efforts demanded 
teamwork among landowners, Confucian planners and advisors of several 
different philosophical persuasions, and local and regional officials. As re-
forms conducted within the Yuan system, these efforts required and received 
cooperation from representatives of all the ethnic classes of that system: 
southern and northern Chinese, Khitans, Tanguts, and other semu, as well as 
Mongols. The reforms were carried out, under the direction of the Confucian 
intelligentsia, not as technical exercises in tax accountancy but as profoundly 
moral exercises in local popular mobilization. The reformers also organized 
local defenses agiinst the Red Turban attack of 1352. 
The radicalization of some of these reform groups—their defection from 
the Yuan cause and their adherence to the warlord and future Ming founder 
Z h u Yuanzhang—occurred precisely at that point when it became clear 
that, after Toghto's forced resignation, the Yuan dynasty would endorse a 
policy of extreme decentralization by co-opting ex-bandits Zhang Shicheng 
and Fang Guozhen into the dynastic system as autonomous 
regional governors in south China. That decision by Yuan central authority 
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in effect canceled all local fiscal reforms, because Zhang and Fang enjoyed 
support from well-off landowners whose interests the reforms had harmed 
or threatened. 
Here the issues of territory, political order, and national morality—as 
understood by the Zhejiang intelligentsia—all came together in one com-
bined package. Morality was key. The intelligentsia believed that most peo-
ple were evil. The good were those few who observed the fundamental 
Confucian imperatives concerning human relations and who were altruistic 
and impartial in their behavior. The evil were the selfish and self-interested. 
The population of China, the intelligentsia believed, was incapable of self-
rule. The people would simply destroy one another in a mad frenzy unless 
the government intervened. But if the government intervened on behalf of 
those very elements whose selfishness simply abetted society's ingrained 
penchant for self-destruction, as the Yuan did when it co-opted Zhang and 
Fang, then civilization must perish. The political unification of China and 
the centralization of its government are necessary because leadership in any 
collective endeavor, as Liu Ji (1311-75) argued, must ultimately have one 
person in absolute charge: 
One who builds a big house will hire many artisans, but there will be one master-
artisan, and no one will dare decide on anything that thwarts his plans. One who 
pilots a big boat will have a big crew, but they must have a captain, without whose 
order they would not dare proceed. When sight and hearing are concentrated in one 
person, affairs do not fail. When the people of the four quarters obey one ruler, they 
are settled. When an army of a million men obeys one commander, it triumphs. 
Liu J i and several other leading members of the Zhejiang intelligentsia 
joined Z h u Yuanzhang in 1360 and played a key role in the founding of the 
Ming.24 What they (and intellectuals elsewhere in China) best recalled of 
the Yuan was its disintegration and collapse so soon after its founding. 
What was it, they asked, that brought that collapse about and led to all the 
horrors of the years of civil war that followed? Above all, what must be done 
to ensure that a post-Yuan dynasty would not repeat that awful experience? 
Concrete and practical answers to the second question shaped with special 
force the directions that the unforgiving Ming state-builders took. If it were 
true, as intellectuals in many parts of South China argued, that the Yuan 
had collapsed because in the end political corruption gave the masses, who 
would otherwise have remained docile, no choice other than to rebel; and if 
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it were true that the Yuan had been corrupt because of rampant favoritism, 
sycophancy, and leniency and that these factors had caused it to die of its 
own internal rot, then clearly the first task of the Ming was to see to it that 
public administration was thoroughly cleansed. But how? 
The ethical fundamentalism of the Zhejiang intellectuals who joined 
Z h u Yuanzhang's warlord regime in 1360 helped provide the answer. 
Nothing less than the total moral reconstruction of the Chinese people in 
light of principles drawn from the Four Books and Five Classics would suf-
fice. There would be a "restoration of antiquity" (fugu and all efforts 
of the new Ming regime would be directed toward the truly revolutionary 
goal of national psychobehavioral rectification, reaching everyone in China, 
from the founding emperor himself down to his military elite, his civil offi-
cials, the Confucian community at large, and even the common farmers in 
the countryside. 
I would argue that the Ming founding constitutes a watershed in China's 
history. Ming propagandists were not wholly wrong to assert that there was 
no historical precedent or model except the golden age of antiquity itself for 
what the Ming was trying to accomplish—not the Song, not the Tang, not 
even the Han. The Yuan was remembered vividly as a powerfully negative 
model, even as the Ming founders tacitly copied some of its institutions, 
adopted its "learning of the mind-and-heart," and took title to the enlarged 
realm it had left behind. The Song as a dynastic model was largely forgot-
ten. Except for the Ming, no dynasty in the period under review was (1) a 
Chinese dynasty in control of so much of "China," (2) founded under the 
close guidance of a militant segment of the national Confucian intelligentsia, 
or (3) dedicated to the use of centralized and autocratic power to impose a 
thoroughgoing program of ethical renewal on the realm. Although that pro-
gram faded after the founder's death in 1398, the autocratic ideal and the in-
stitutional order that he created did not. They were directly invoked at 
many moments of crisis, as in 1468,1519,1524, and in the Donglin J ^ L ^ UP" 
heavals of the 1620s. 
So the Mongols mattered. Without their presence, it is impossible to 
imagine the later history of Ming, Qing, and modern China. It was the 
Mongols who established the ethnic landscape of "China" proper. It was the 
Mongols who, early in the fourteenth century, established a simplified ver-
sion of Daoxue national orthodoxy through state-provided education and 
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the civil service examination system, an arrangement that continued, under 
the Ming and Qing, to the turn of the twentieth century. And in ways the 
Ming acknowledged by way of negative critique, it was the Yuan dynasty 
whose short and calamitous tenure in China suggested institutional simplifi-
cation, moral reconstruction, and an unleashed autocracy as solutions to the 
problems of national governance. 
